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The economies of some countries in the eurozone
have displayed high rates of inflation for some years.
To the extent that the EMU member states in addi-
tion have high deficits on current accounts, which is
not seldom the case, their economies are clearly no
longer sufficiently competitive. This is a situation that
has touched of alarm signals at the European
Commission and the European Central Bank. An
additional factor is that the debts of these countries
are constantly increasing as a result of the expansion
in government tasks and the failure to cover expendi-
tures by taxation. For any additional debt these coun-
tries must pay increasingly higher risk premiums that
are demanded by investors on the basis of the poorer
creditworthiness assigned to them by the rating agen-
cies. For these member states the danger of insolven-
cy exists. With the threat of national bankruptcy and
because of the preceding economic-policy mistakes
of several member states, the continued existence of
the European Monetary Union and the stability of
the euro, as seen in its loss of value, are greatly
endangered.
Member states that belong to the monetary union no
longer have their own monetary and currency sover-
eignty. They no longer have the option of reducing
their debts via a monetary or paramonetary financ-
ing of their budgets in order to avoid national bank-
ruptcy. They are no longer able to reduce debts via
non-secured credits of a dependent central bank or
via a currency reform. 
Upon entering the monetary union the member states
obligated themselves, in the interest of the stability of
the monetary union and its currency, to fulfil, on their
own responsibility and for the long term, the eco-
nomic and legal conditions prescribed by the
Maastricht Treaty. The stability of the common
European currency urgently requires that the states
participating in the monetary union do not under-
mine the monetary policies of the European Union
with their economic, budgetary or wage policies. And
it must not be forgotten that monetary policies aimed
at currency stability are also social policies since infla-
tion means an unsocial redistribution of earnings.
The heads of state and governments of the so-called
euro group expressed their deep concerns regarding
the dangerous economic developments in one member
state at a special meeting on 12 February 2010.
Solidarity prohibits the European Union from blindly
leaving struggling member states to their own fate.
However, at the same time, in order to ensure the inte-
gration process in Europe, the EU must act in accor-
dance with the concerns of the monetary union and
the interests of the other member states.
The same rules that hold for a federal state do not
apply within the European Monetary Union. In a fed-
eral state, the member states and the federal state itself
carry an unlimited liability for the obligations and the
insolvency of an indebted member state. The contain-
ment of an unsound or even unconstitutional fiscal
policy of a member state is the task and obligation of
public opinion, policy and justice in a federal state.
Conversely, in an alliance of states the member states
and the alliance itself are fundamentally not liable for
the liabilities of a heavily indebted member state.
To be sure, the Maastricht Treaty did indeed upgrade
the European Economic Community into a so-called
Economic and Currency Union and transferred the
monetary and currency sovereignty of the member
states to the European Union. However, the member
states participating in the monetary union were placed
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in a situation comparable with members of a federal
state. This is because the simultaneous transformation
of the European Union into a federal state, or the
transformation of the ‘United Nations of Europe’
into ‘United Europe’ with a transfer of additional
policy areas, especially economic policy, social policy
and tax sovereignty to the European Union, which in
itself would have been the prerequisite for turning
over monetary and currency sovereignty to the EU,
was neither politically desired nor would have been
politically attainable.
Since the basic structure of the European Community
as an alliance of states – with, to be sure, considerable
supranational features – was not newly constituted as
a federal alliance of states, a decision had to be taken
in the Maastricht Treaty as to whether the member
states and the European Union should be liable for
the financial obligations of a member state facing
insolvency by vouching for these debts. As a result of
a consciously made decision, whose material impor-
tance and far-reaching consequences were clear to all
countries participating in the Maastricht conference,
the Maastricht Treaty states explicitly that neither the
European Community, now the European Union, as
such nor its member states must vouch for the debts of
a member country that participates in the monetary
union – as in the case of a federal state.
Although Germany placed particular emphasis on
the absolute liability exclusion as a prerequisite for
abandoning the deutschmark as a national currency,
the no-bailout clause was an unconditional prereq-
uisite not only for Germany but for all member
states participating in the conference for transfer-
ring monetary and currency policies from national
responsibility to the exclusive responsibility of the
European Community. The unconditional direct
responsibility of the member states for their bud-
getary and fiscal policies that results from the no-
bailout agreement was accepted by all the member
states as an ordering principle of the Maastricht
process. For the member states, there was only the
alternative of either completely refusing to establish
a monetary union or agreeing on the absolute exclu-
sion of mutual liability.
The prohibition of assuming the debts of a member
state and the direct responsibility of the member
states for reducing their indebtedness had as a conse-
quence that the European Union does not have the
authority to provide financial assistance, with the
exception of help that is permissible under EU law in
cases of catastrophes and economic predicaments in
which there was no erroneous economic-policy behav-
iour on the part of a member state. 
The European Union can also not grant financial sup-
port by means of borrowing on the capital markets
and transferring this to a member state that is threat-
ened by insolvency due to over-indebtedness on a
non-contractual basis nor on the basis of the so-called
flexibility clause of Article 352 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (for-
merly Article 235 EEC Treaty and Article 308 EC
Treaty).
Furthermore, in Germany the use of such authorisa-
tions, as are currently being discussed, would require
special legislation from the Bundestag, according to
the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court on the
Lisbon Treaty of 30 June 2009.
The liability exclusion, the prohibition of monetary
and paramonetary financing of government budgets
and the obligation of the member states to limit their
annual upper deficit limits to 3 percent of GDP and
their total indebtedness to at most 60 percent of GDP
safeguard price stability in the European Union as a
basic constitutional principle and the value of the
euro as its common currency. A country’s tax revenue
does not stand at the disposal of other member states
or of the European Union. It is reserved for the
financing of the national tasks and obligations of the
respective member state.
Control measures in the form of legal actions before
the European Court of Justice or through the imposi-
tion of sanctions in supervision procedures dealing
with the budget situation of the member states, both
of which are only possible under very restricted con-
ditions and which are also not particularly effective,
to force a member state to comply with its Maastricht
obligations are only available in a very limited form in
the European Union. Appealing to the European
Court of Justice is largely excluded in the Maastricht
Treaty in the area of the monetary union. The impo-
sition of sanctions within the framework of the super-
vision of the budget situation of the member states,
which is not subject to any automatic procedures,
involves complicated procedural steps that require a
majority vote. 
Correcting the financial imbalances in a member state
that faces insolvency consists inevitably in the reduc-
tion of governmental tasks and an increase of the taxCESifo Forum 2/2011 28
Focus
burden on the population. Should it be the case that
due to pressure from the unavoidable efforts of a
member state domestic unrest results and democratic
and legal processes in the country can no longer be
maintained, the European Union would be faced with
the decision of whether it would have to initiate pro-
cedures against the member state to deprive it of cer-
tain rights, as foreseen in Article 7 of the EU Treaty
(formerly Article 7 of the Maastricht Treaty).
In addition, membership in the monetary union is by
no means compulsory according to the Maastricht
rules. Instead, alongside member states that are part
of the monetary union the Maastricht Treaty also
recognises ‘member states with an exceptional status’.
‘Exceptional status’, by which member states, for
example Britain, Denmark and Sweden as well as
Poland and other member states that have subse-
quently joined the EU and that are not degraded into
the second ranks, can also be granted afterwards to
members of the currency union. The European Union
can offer to a member state that can only normalise its
finances and economy on its own ‘by means of or
with a miracle’ the possibility of becoming a member
state with ‘exceptional status’, i.e. the relinquishing of
its membership in the currency union and the re-intro-
duction of its own currency. 
The rescinding of membership in the monetary union
would have to occur by means of a joint decision of
the Council consisting of the heads of state and gov-
ernment and would grounded in EU law on the basis
of Article 2 TFEU. Article 2, Paragraph 1 TFEU as
well as Article I 12 of the failed constitutional treaty
allows a member state in the area of exclusive compe-
tence of the European Union – monetary and curren-
cy policies are an exclusive competence – the ‘powers
to legislate’ upon authorisation of the European
Union. Accordingly, it can also rescind its participa-
tion in the common monetary policies and re-intro-
duce its own currency.
The admissibility of the mutually agreed departure is
also based – a maiore ad minorem, from the greater to
the smaller – on Article 50 EU Treaty, according to
which any member state of the European Union can
quite simply leave also from sub-areas of their com-
petence. After a departure the member state can
attempt to restore the competitiveness of its economy
under the new conditions of its own currency via an
exchange rate correction in the form of suitable deval-
uation. Furthermore, in case of a balance of pay-
ments crisis the member state can take advantage of
the ‘mutual assistance’ based on the protection claus-
es in Articles 143 and 144 TFEU under the new con-
ditions. In addition according to the arrangements of
the European Monetary System II it can attain ‘mon-
etary support’ more easily. Under these conditions the
European Union can contribute to an economically
sensible stabilisation of its external equilibrium.
Assistance from the International Monetary Fund in
comparable cases also presupposes that the state that
is to receive help, in addition to an economic recovery
programme, must adjust its currency to external eco-
nomic factors, which means a possible devaluation of
its currency. The departure from the monetary union
– if only temporarily – is for the benefit of a weakened
member state. It makes sense in terms of economic
and integration policy and it is also vital in an emer-
gency. It lies both in the interest of the weakened
member state as well as in the interest of the preser-
vation of the monetary union. 
The European integration process as such will be
consolidated and not weakened by a correction of
this process consisting of the timely departure of a
member.